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European Central Bank Working Paper Series 30Abstract
This paper studies optimal discretionary monetary policy in the
presence of uncertainty about the degree of ￿nancial frictions. Changes
in the degree of ￿nancial frictions are modelled as changes in parame-
ters of a hybrid New-Keynesian model calibrated for the UK, follow-
ing Bean, Larsen and Nikolov (2002). Uncertainty about the degree
of ￿nancial frictions is modelled as Markov switching between regimes
without and with strong ￿nancial frictions. Optimal monetary pol-
icy is determined for di⁄erent scenarios of permanent and temporary
regime shifts in ￿nancial frictions, as well as for variations in ￿nancial
frictions over the business cycle. Optimal monetary policy is found to
be state-dependent. In each state, optimal monetary policy depends
on the transition probabilities between the di⁄erent regimes.
JEL classi￿cation: E52, E58, E61, E44
Key words: monetary policy; uncertainty; ￿nancial frictions.
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This paper studies optimal discretionary monetary policy in the presence
of uncertainty about the degree of ￿nancial frictions, following the approach
of Bean, Larsen and Nikolov (2002) of modelling changes in the degree of
￿nancial frictions within a hybrid New-Keynesian model calibrated for the
UK. Optimal monetary policy is considered within di⁄erent scenarios of tem-
porary and permanent regime changes. Such scenario analysis may help to
inform policy, based on judgements about likely developments in the degree
of ￿nancial frictions. We also investigate optimal monetary policy in the pres-
ence of variations in ￿nancial frictions over the business cycles, since credit
constraints are more likely to be binding in times of an economic downturn.
Uncertainty about the degree of ￿nancial frictions is assumed to be gov-
erned by a Markov process in two model parameters characterising the degree
of ￿nancial frictions, the interest sensitivity of demand and the degree of en-
dogenous output persistence. Optimal monetary policy is found to be state-
dependent; in each state, optimal policy depends on the transition probabil-
ities between states with di⁄erent degrees of ￿nancial frictions. Associated
impulse responses to cost-push shocks and demand shocks are also presented.
For the calibration of the model and of the regimes without and and with
strong ￿nancial frictions for the UK considered here, optimal policy is found
to react more aggressively to the lagged output gap when transitions to the
state with strong ￿nancial frictions are more likely. The dependence of the
coe¢ cients of the optimal policy feedback rule on the transition probabilities
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June 20061 Introduction
This paper studies optimal discretionary monetary policy in the presence of
uncertainty about the degree of ￿nancial frictions. Changes in the degree of
￿nancial frictions are modelled as changes in parameters of a hybrid New-
Keynesian model calibrated for the UK, following Bean, Larsen and Nikolov
(2002). Uncertainty about the degree of ￿nancial frictions is modelled as
Markov switching between regimes of no and strong ￿nancial frictions. Opti-
mal monetary policy is determined for di⁄erent scenarios of permanent and
temporary regime shifts in ￿nancial frictions, as well as for variations in
￿nancial frictions over the business cycle.
The role of ￿nancial frictions in closed economies has been studied in
structural models for example in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999),
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Cooley and
Quadrini (1999). The question of how monetary policy should be conducted
optimally in the presence of uncertainty about ￿nancial frictions has been
considered more recently for example in Bean, Larsen and Nikolov (2002) and
Bean (2003). Bean, Larsen and Nikolov (2002) study optimal policy under
commitment within a hybrid New-Keynesian model with di⁄erent degrees
of ￿nancial frictions. They also consider robust optimal policy when there
is uncertainty about the model parameters governing the degree of ￿nancial
frictions.
The modelling of the degree of ￿nancial frictions in this paper follows
Bean, Larsen and Nikolov (2002), who model changes in the degree of ￿nan-
cial frictions as changes in the values of the interest sensitivity of demand
and the degree of endogenous output persistence in the IS curve, within a
hybrid New-Keynesian model calibrated for the UK. A higher interest sen-
sitivity of demand in a regime with strong ￿nancial frictions may be moti-
vated by higher debt levels of households, making households more exposed
to increases in interest rates, and consequently amplifying the response of
demand to changes in interest rates. Higher endogenous output persistence
in the state of strong ￿nancial frictions may be motivated by the presence of
credit-constrained ￿rms, whose investment decisions will partly depend on
past pro￿ts and cash ￿ ow. This is a simple approach which does not model
￿nancial frictions structurally, but captures two key features that tend to be
generated by ￿nancial frictions, namely more persistent demand and output
movements, and an ampli￿ed response of demand to changes in interest rates.
Note, however, that these two parameters may also change for reasons other
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costs or in habit persistence of consumption.
Endogenous credit constraints are one mechanism which may generate
both intrinsic output persistence and ampli￿cation (see Kocherlakota (2000)).
Due to incomplete enforceability of contracts between borrowers and lenders,
and a moral hazard problem in debt markets, credit limits may depend on
the value of assets used as collateral, such as land and housing. As asset
prices fall in an economic downturn, borrowing limits become binding for
more ￿rms and households. Consequently, fewer ￿rms can borrow against
their expected future pro￿ts, and fewer households can borrow against their
expected future income. Therefore, investment decisions depend to a greater
extent on past pro￿ts and cash ￿ ow, leading to greater persistence, and
consumption decisions depend to a greater extent on current income. The
reduction in debt capacity is likely to lead to a decrease in investment and
consumption, exacerbating the economic downturn, thereby providing an
ampli￿cation mechanism.
We extend the modelling approach of Bean, Larsen and Nikolov (2002)
by allowing for temporary changes in the degree of ￿nancial frictions in the
economy over time between regimes without and with strong ￿nancial fric-
tions, and for variations over the business cycle. The motivation for studying
optimal monetary policy within di⁄erent scenarios of temporary and perma-
nent regime changes is to inform policy, based on judgements about likely
developments in the degree of ￿nancial frictions. For example, policy makers
might be interested to determine how interest rates should be set optimally
given the possibility of a large fall in house prices, and an associated increase
in ￿nancial frictions, as a function of the likelihood assigned to such an event.
It is also of interest to study optimal monetary policy in the presence of vari-
ations in ￿nancial frictions over the business cycles, since credit constraints
are likely to be more binding in times of recession, and less binding in an
economic boom.
The degree of ￿nancial frictions is assumed to be governed by a Markov
process in the two parameters of the model characterizing the degree of ￿nan-
cial frictions.1 The motivation for this approach is to be able to capture the
likely episodic and asymmetric nature of changes in the degree of ￿nancial
frictions. Modelling the changes between regimes without and with strong
1The Markov process governing the uncertainty about the degree of ￿nancial frictions
is assumed to be known to all agents in the economy.
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icy with low as well as high transition probabilities between regimes, and for
asymmetric as well as symmetric regime shifts. Optimal policy is determined
as a function of the transition probabilities of the Markov process govern-
ing the uncertainty about the degree of ￿nancial frictions, using a method
for solving for optimal discretionary policy in rational expectations models
with regime switching (see Moessner (2006)), which is described in the ap-
pendix. An alternative algorithm for time-consistent optimal policy with
Markov switching based on a semi-structural model representation is pre-
sented in Blake and Zampolli (2006), for backward-looking models in Zam-
polli (2006), and other algorithms for optimal monetary policy with Markov
regime switching, under both commitment and discretion, are presented in
Svensson and Williams (2005) .
This paper considers optimal monetary policy in the presence of regime
switching in the degree of ￿nancial frictions, modelled as Markov processes
in two parameters, the degree of endogenous output persistence and the in-
terest elasticity of demand, as a function of the transition probabilities of the
Markov process. Earlier papers have studied optimal policy when one or both
of these parameters are uncertain, assuming a symmetric prior probability
distribution on the part of the central bank, and focussing on the question of
whether policy is certainty-equivalent or not. In particular, Brainard (1967)
found within a static model that policy should be more cautious when the
policy multiplier is uncertain. Soederstroem (2002) found within a dynamic
backward-looking model that policy is more cautious when the interest elas-
ticity of demand is uncertain, but that policy may respond more aggressively
to shocks when endogenous persistence is uncertain. This paper focusses on
determining optimal monetary policy in each of two possible states charac-
terizing the degree of ￿nancial frictions, with possible shifts between the two,
as a function of the transition probabilities between the two states, within a
rational expectations model.
While optimal policy under commitment is desirable from a normative
viewpoint (see Woodford (1999)), from a positive viewpoint, central banks
generally do not have a commitment technology available, and central bank
behaviour is best described as discretionary (see Issing et al. (2001)). This
paper therefore considers optimal discretionary monetary policy with uncer-
tainty about ￿nancial frictions. Optimal monetary policy is found to be state-
dependent. In each state, optimal monetary policy depends on the transition
probabilities between the two regimes. We consider low as well as high tran-
8
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Associated impulse responses to cost-push shocks and demand shocks are
also presented.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the New-
Keynesian model and the regimes without and with strong ￿nancial frictions.
Section 3 introduces uncertainty about the degree of ￿nancial frictions, solves
for optimal discretionary policy in the face of uncertainty about the degree
of ￿nancial frictions, and presents associated impulse responses. Finally,
Section 4 concludes.
2 Baseline model
We study optimal policy within a hybrid New-Keynesian model (see Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (1999)) used in Bean, Larsen and Nikolov (2002), calibrated
for the UK,
yt = ￿Etyt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)yt￿1 ￿ ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + egt (1)
￿t = ￿!Et￿t+1 + ￿(1 ￿ !)￿t￿1 + ￿yt + eut (2)
egt+1 = ￿gegt + ￿gt+1 (3)
eut+1 = ￿ueut + ￿ut+1 (4)
We use the calibration of this model for the UK of Bean, Larsen and Nikolov
(2002) (see Table A), who consider iid shocks. We therefore set the autocor-
relations of the shocks to very small values (￿g = ￿u = 10￿11).
The calibration of the regimes without and with strong ￿nancial fric-
tions is also taken from Bean, Larsen and Nikolov (2002). The state with
strong ￿nancial frictions is modelled as having a higher interest sensitivity
of demand, ￿, and a higher degree of endogenous output persistence in the
IS-curve, (1 ￿ ￿) (see Table B).
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Table B: Calibration of the scenarios for the degree of ￿nancial frictions (see
Bean, Larsen and Nikolov (2002)).
No ￿nancial frictions Strong ￿nancial frictions
￿ 0.9 0.1
￿ 0.4 0.8
The higher interest sensitivity of demand could arise for example from
higher debt levels of households, making households more exposed to in-
creases in interest rates, and consequently amplifying the response of de-
mand to changes in interest rates. Higher endogenous output persistence
in the state of strong ￿nancial frictions could arise from the presence of
credit-constrained ￿rms, whose investment decisions will partly depend on
past pro￿ts and cash ￿ ow. This introduces additional persistence (see Bean,
Larsen and Nikolov (2002) for a more detailed discussion). This approach
does not explicitly model ￿nancial frictions, but captures two key features
of ￿nancial frictions, namely that ￿nancial frictions tend to generate greater
persistence in demand and output movements, and that they tend to amplify
responses of demand to changes in interest rates.
The central bank is assumed to conduct optimal monetary policy under










t + ￿i(it ￿ it￿1)
2￿
: (5)
Here, ￿t, yt and it denote log-deviations of in￿ ation, the output gap and the
gross nominal interest rate from their steady-state values. The parameters
of the central bank￿ s loss function are chosen as follows, ￿y = 1 to re￿ ect a
concern of the monetary authority for output stabilisation, and ￿i = 0:25 to
10
ECB
Working Paper Series No 639
June 2006re￿ ect a concern for smoothing short-term nominal interest rates. As shown
in Woodford (1999), a concern for interest rate smoothing on the part of the
central bank is desirable when conducting optimal discretionary policy.
The policy maker￿ s control variable is the nominal interest rate it. Prede-
termined state variables are lagged output and in￿ ation, yt￿1 and ￿t￿1, and
the two shocks egt and eut; jump variables are output and in￿ ation, yt and
￿t.
3 Optimal policy with uncertainty about the
degree of ￿nancial frictions
We consider optimal discretionary policy in the model of Bean, Larsen and
Nikolov (2002), extending it to allow for temporary changes in the degree of
￿nancial frictions over time. We model the changes in the economy￿ s degree
of ￿nancial frictions as a Markov-switching process in the parameters char-
acterizing the degree of ￿nancial frictions, namely the interest sensitivity of
demand, and the degree of endogenous output persistence in the IS curve.
The ￿rst state without ￿nancial frictions is modelled as having a lower in-
terest sensitivity of demand (￿1 = 0:4) and a lower degree of endogenous
output persistence (1￿￿1 = 0:1) than the second state with strong ￿nancial
frictions, where ￿2 = 0:8 and 1 ￿ ￿2 = 0:9 (see Table B). The transition
of the economy between these two states is assumed to be governed by a
Markov process with transition probability matrix P=(pij), where pij is the









We assume that the states and the transition probabilities of the Markov
process are known to all agents in the economy. But while current realisations
of the Markov states are assumed to be observable, future realisations of the
Markov states are assumed to be unobservable. Under optimal discretionary
policy in the presence of regime switching, the interest rate is set by the
policy authority as a function of the predetermined variables of the model.
Moreover, the optimal interest rate feedback rule is state-dependent, with
11
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Rit￿1 ; i = 1;2: (6)
The optimal monetary policy rule in each state depends on the transition
probabilities between the regimes. It is determined below using the algorithm
described in the appendix.
As a benchmark, the coe¢ cients of the optimal policy rule in each state,
assuming that no transitions between the two states are possible, are given in
Table C. In the state with strong ￿nancial frictions, it is optimal for interest
rates to respond more strongly to the lagged output gap and deviations of
in￿ ation from steady-state. With higher endogenous output persistence in
the IS-curve, it is optimal for policy to respond more aggressively to lagged
output deviations, since otherwise these deviations would persist for longer,
causing larger deviations in future periods. This e⁄ect dominates the impact
of the higher interest sensitivity of demand. If only the interest sensitivity of
demand increased, but endogenous output persistence remained unchanged,
then it would be optimal for policy to respond less to the lagged output gap
in the state of strong ￿nancial frictions.
Table C: Coe¢ cients of optimal policy rule in each state, assuming no tran-
sitions between the states without and with strong ￿nancial frictions are







No ￿nancial frictions 0.08 0.69 0.84 0.88 0.29
Strong ￿nancial frictions 0.77 1.19 0.86 1.51 0.11
3.1 Scenario analysis for permanent and temporary
regime changes
In this section we study optimal policy within di⁄erent scenarios of tempo-
rary and permanent regime changes in the degree of ￿nancial frictions. The
motivation for studying optimal monetary policy within di⁄erent scenarios
of temporary and permanent regime changes is to perform scenario analysis
of how interest rates should be set optimally, for example based on policy
makers￿judgement of likely developments in the degree of ￿nancial frictions.
Policy makers might for example be interested in the possible e⁄ect on the
12
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sociated increase in ￿nancial frictions, depending on the likelihood assigned
to such a fall.
The case of a permanent regime change is considered ￿rst. The coe¢ cients
of the optimal policy rule in each state are shown in Figure 1, for the case
where there is a non-zero probability, p, of a permanent change from the
state without ￿nancial frictions to the state with strong ￿nancial frictions.
For one value of p = 0:1, the corresponding results for the coe¢ cients of the
optimal interest rate feedback rule in each state are presented in Table D.
Table D: Coe¢ cients of optimal policy rule in each state, allowing for a
permanent shift from the regime without to the regime with strong ￿nancial







No ￿nancial frictions 0.47 0.99 0.94 1.25 0.16
Strong ￿nancial frictions 0.77 1.19 0.86 1.51 0.11
We can see from Table D and Figure 1 that in the presence of regime
switching, the optimal interest rate feedback rule is state-dependent, with
di⁄erent coe¢ cients in each state. We can also see that when there is a non-
zero probability of moving away from the original state, the magnitude of the
coe¢ cients in the optimal policy rule depends on the transition probability to
the other state. Due to the existence of lags in the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy, and due to the forward-looking nature of policy setting
and private agents￿expectations, it becomes optimal for the central bank
to take the uncertainty about the degree of ￿nancial frictions into account
when setting interest rates. The magnitudes of the coe¢ cients of the optimal
policy rule depend nonlinearly on the transition probabilities.2 We can see
from Figure 1 that as p increases, it becomes optimal to respond more ag-
gressively to the lagged output gap and in￿ ation, as well as to the cost-push
2If interest rate volatility, i2
t, rather than (it￿it￿1)
2, enters the central bank￿ s loss
function, the pattern for the dependence of the feedback coe¢ cients of the optimal policy
rule on the transition probability, p, is similar to that shown in Figure 1, but there is no
feedback on lagged interest rates.
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strong ￿nancial frictions, where output deviations persist for longer, poten-
tially requiring greater output contractions in future. It is therefore optimal
for policy to prevent large deviations initially by reacting more aggressively
to shocks. By contrast, the optimal policy response to demand shocks as a
function of p shows no clear pattern. This may happen since there are two
competing e⁄ects. While greater endogenous output persistence on its own
would require a stronger initial reaction to the demand shock, to prevent
large shocks from entering the system during a possible regime of strong ￿-
nancial frictions, the possibility of a greater interest elasticity of demand has
an opposing e⁄ect. If only the interest elasticity of demand increased in the
regime with strong ￿nancial frictions, then it would be optimal for policy to
respond less aggressively to demand shocks, since a given change in interest
rates is able to o⁄set the shock to a greater extent when demand is more
sensitive to interest rates.
Similarly, Figure 2 shows the coe¢ cients of the optimal policy rule in
each state when there is a non-zero probability, q, of a permanent change
from the state with strong ￿nancial frictions to the state without ￿nancial
frictions. We can see that as the probability of moving to a regime without
￿nancial frictions increases, it becomes optimal for policy to respond less
aggressively to deviations in the output gap and in￿ ation and to cost-push
shocks. As it becomes more likely to move to a regime without ￿nancial
frictions, where output deviations are less persistent, policy does not need to
react as aggressively, since less persistent deviations potentially require less
output contraction in future, and are therefore less costly. In analogy to the
case of a regime shift in the opposite direction shown in Figure 1, the pattern
for the response to demand shocks as a function of the transition probability
is less clear, due to the two opposing e⁄ects of a change in endogenous output
persistence and in the interest elasticity of demand.
We can see from Figures 1 and 2 that there is an asymmetry between the
two states in the dependence of the coe¢ cients of the optimal interest rate
rule on the transition probability from the original to the other state. For a
small transition probability, assuming a permanent change, the coe¢ cients
change by more when there is a chance of moving from the state without
￿nancial frictions to the state with strong ￿nancial frictions (see Figure 1),
than when there is a chance of moving from the state with strong ￿nancial
frictions to the state without ￿nancial frictions (see Figure 2). For a tran-
sition probability of 0:5 from the original state to the other state, assuming
14
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the state with strong ￿nancial frictions, than to those in the state without
￿nancial frictions in the absence of regime switching.
Results for optimal policy with temporary regime changes are presented
in Figure 3. Figure 3 shows the coe¢ cients of the optimal monetary policy
rule when temporary regime changes between the states with and without
￿nancial frictions are possible, as a function of the transition probability, p,
from state 1 to state 2, for a given transition probability in the opposite
direction of q = 0:5. Now the coe¢ cients in both states depend on the tran-
sition probability p, and it is optimal for policy to respond more aggressively
to lagged output deviations as the transition probability to the state with
strong ￿nancial frictions increases. For one value of p = 0:1, the correspond-
ing values for the coe¢ cients of the optimal interest rate feedback rule are
presented in Table E.
Table E: Coe¢ cients of optimal policy rule in each state, allowing for tem-
porary shifts between the regimes without and with strong ￿nancial frictions







No ￿nancial frictions 0.47 0.99 0.93 1.25 0.16
Strong ￿nancial frictions 0.71 1.15 0.86 1.45 0.12
The dependence of the coe¢ cients of the optimal policy rule on the tran-
sition probabilities governing the uncertainty about the degree of ￿nancial
frictions is also re￿ ected in the impulse responses of output and in￿ ation to
demand and cost-push shocks, which are considered next. Figure 4 shows
impulse responses to a cost-push shock, on average over 1000 di⁄erent real-
izations of the Markov process, for transition probabilities of 0:1 between the
states with and without ￿nancial frictions in both directions. Figure 5 shows
the corresponding impulse responses to a demand shock. We can see that the
asymmetry of the dependence of the coe¢ cients of the optimal policy rule on
the transition probabilities between the two states is re￿ ected in the impulse
responses. For the symmetric transition probabilities considered here, the
impulse responses tend to lie closer to those in the state with strong ￿nancial
frictions in the absence of regime switching. This is in agreement with the
15
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and 2.
3.2 Business cycle variations in ￿nancial frictions
It is also interesting to study optimal monetary policy in the presence of
variations in ￿nancial frictions over the business cycles, since credit con-
straints are likely to be more binding in times of recession, and less binding
in an economic boom. Business cycle ￿ uctuations are typically associated
with ￿ uctuations over 6 to 32 quarters, based on the de￿nition of Burns
and Mitchell (1946), as used more recently for example in Baxter and King
(1999). Here, we choose a value of 20 quarters for the duration of a business
cycle, lying in the middle of that range.
Business cycle ￿ uctuations are modelled by allowing the demand shock
in equation 1, egt, to follow a Markov process, re￿ ecting variations in the
natural real interest rate over the business cycle, rather than representing an
iid shock as assumed above. The Markov states are chosen as a state with a
positive value for the business cycle indicator egt of +0:5 (state 1), and a state
with a negative value of ￿0:5 (state 2), with a probability of remaining in
each state on average for 10 quarters, which implies a transition probability
of p = q = 0:1 between the two states. Business cycle variations in the
degree of ￿nancial frictions are then modelled by assuming that the changes
between the regimes without and with strong ￿nancial frictions follow the
same Markov process as that governing the changes in the business cycle












Rit￿1 ; i = 1;2 (7)
with a state-dependent intercept fi
c.
If the degree of ￿nancial frictions does not change over the business cycle,
with model parameters taking their benchmark values of Table A, then the
intercepts fi
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Positive demand shock 0.47 0.99 -0.01 1.25 0.16
Negative demand shock 0.76 1.19 -0.54 1.50 0.11
However, if the degree of ￿nancial frictions varies over the business cycle,
this is no longer the case. Instead, the intercept in state 1 may even become
slightly negative, given the possibility of moving to a state with a negative
demand shock in the presence of strong ￿nancial frictions (see Table F). This
may happen since there is a possibility that the demand shock has a nega-
tive realization in the regime where output ￿ uctuations are more persistent,
which would be relatively costly. The gain from o⁄setting some of the poten-
tially contractionary demand shock, should the economy move to a regime
with strong ￿nancial frictions, outweighs the loss from not o⁄setting a pos-
itive demand shock in the less persistent regime without ￿nancial frictions,
should no regime shift occur, since less persistent shocks are less costly. The
results of the previous section for the behaviour of the other coe¢ cients of the
optimal policy rule in the states with di⁄erent degrees of ￿nancial frictions
carry over to the case of business cycle ￿ uctuations considered here.
4 Conclusions
This paper studied optimal discretionary monetary policy in the presence of
uncertainty about the degree of ￿nancial frictions, following the approach of
Bean, Larsen and Nikolov (2002) of modelling changes in the degree of ￿nan-
cial frictions within a hybrid New-Keynesian model calibrated for the UK.
Optimal monetary policy within di⁄erent scenarios of temporary and per-
manent regime changes was considered. Such scenario analysis may help to
inform policy, based on judgements about likely developments in the degree
of ￿nancial frictions. We also studied optimal monetary policy in the pres-
ence of variations in ￿nancial frictions over the business cycles, since credit
constraints are likely to be more binding in times of an economic downturn.
Uncertainty about the degree of ￿nancial frictions was assumed to be
governed by a Markov process in two model parameters characterising the
17
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June 2006degree of ￿nancial frictions, the interest sensitivity of demand and the degree
of endogenous output persistence in the IS curve. Optimal monetary policy
was found to be state-dependent. In each state, optimal policy was found to
depend on the transition probabilities between states with di⁄erent degrees
of ￿nancial frictions. Associated impulse responses were also presented.
For the calibration of the model and of the regimes with high and low
degrees of ￿nancial frictions for the UK considered here, optimal policy was
found to react more aggressively to the lagged output gap when transitions to
the state with strong ￿nancial frictions are more likely. The nonlinear depen-
dence of the coe¢ cients of the optimal policy feedback rule on the transition
probabilities between the states with high and low degrees of ￿nancial fric-
tions was also illustrated.
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with regime switching
This appendix describes an algorithm for solving for optimal discretionary
policy in rational expectations models with regime switching (see Moessner
(2005) for more details). This algorithm is based on the state-space represen-
tation of the rational expectations model, and extends the solution method of
Backus and Dri¢ ll (1986) (see also Soederlind 1999) to the case with regime
switching.3 The algorithm is used in the main part of the paper to solve for
optimal discretionary policy with regime switching in the degree of ￿nancial






where xt is the vector of state variables, consisting of the predetermined
variables x1t and the jump variables x2t, and ut is the vector of control












Under discretion, the central bank reoptimises every period, taking x1t and
the private agents￿expectations as given. Without regime-switching, the
optimisation is subject to linear transition equations for xt describing the




























of state variables has been partitioned into n1
predetermined state variables x1t, and n2 jump variables x2t, and It is the
information set at time t of all agents in the economy. The errors "t+1
3An alternative algorithm for time-consistent optimal policy with Markov switching
based on a semi-structural model representation is presented in Blake and Zampolli (2006),
for backward-looking models in Zampolli (2006), and other algorithms for optimal policy
with Markov regime switching under both commitment and discretion are presented in
Svensson and Williams (2005).
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is time-invariant, and which are uncorrelated with the
predetermined variables x1t. 0n2x1is a zero matrix of size n2x1.
Regime switching is assumed to follow a Markov process. The probability
of moving from one state s
t at time t to another state s
t+1 at time t + 1 is




t+1 lying in the set S of possible states of the economy. The transition
probabilities are summarized in the transition matrix
P = (pij); i;j = 1;::::;N; (11)
where pij ￿ p(s
t+1 = jjst = i); and the set of possible states, S, is assumed
to contain N di⁄erent states. At time t, the current state, st; is assumed to
be observed by all agents in the economy, while the state in the next period,
st+1; is not yet observed. Private agents￿expectations include expectations
over the unknown states s
t+1 2 S in the next period,









The matrices A and B governing the evolution of the economy from time
t to t + 1 are allowed to be state-dependent, depending on the state in the
next period, st+1; which is not observable at time t. Taking expectations for





















































































Since at time t the policy authority does not know the Markov states in
the next period, st+1, the Bellman equation under partial information with
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June 2006subject to the transition equations 13, with private sector expectations E[x2t+1 j
It] and x1t taken as given in the optimisation, and with a state-dependent
value function. Indexing the current state, st, by i, and the state in the next
period, st+1, by j, and denoting the state-dependence of matrices by super-















The optimal policy rule is assumed to depend linearly on predetermined
variables in each state, as is appropriate for linear quadratic problems. But
the coe¢ cients of the optimal policy rule switch between the values in the
di⁄erent states, which makes optimal policy nonlinear over time, as the para-
meter values switch between the di⁄erent possible regimes.4 This assumption
follows Zampolli (2005) for backward-looking models. Private agents form
expectations about x2t+1 according to equation 17, based on their limited
information set, It. The matrices Ci
t and V i
t are assumed not to depend on
the additive shocks.














t x1t + x0
1tUi￿
t ut + u0
tUi￿0










t x1t + B
ij￿





t x1t + B
ij￿




















































4While this assumption yields an algorithm converging to a solution, it is not self-
evident that this solution is unique. Other assumptions about the form of the optimal
policy rule, such as a nonlinear dependence on predetermined variables in each state, may
also yield a solution, but choosing a particular form for such a nonliear dependence in each
state seems somewhat arbitrary.
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where the matrices Q and U have been partitioned conformably with x1t and
x2t.
Equations for the matrices in the optimal feedback rule and the value






































































i = 1;::::;N: (21)
A stationary solution may be found by iterating backwards in time until
convergence on equations 19, 20 and 21, and this is done to solve for optimal
policy in the main part of the paper.
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June 2006Figure 1: State-dependent coe¢ cients of the optimal policy feedback rule
in the regimes without and with strong ￿nancial frictions, as a function of
the transition probability p from the state without ￿nancial frictions to the
state with strong ￿nancial frictions; assuming a zero probability, q, of moving
in the opposite direction from the state with strong ￿nancial frictions to the
state without ￿nancial frictions.
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June 2006Figure 2: State-dependent coe¢ cients of the optimal policy feedback rule
in the regimes without and with strong ￿nancial frictions, as a function of the
transition probability q from the state with strong ￿nancial frictions to the
state without ￿nancial frictions; assuming a zero probability, p, of moving in
the opposite direction from the state without ￿nancial frictions to the state
with strong ￿nancial frictions.
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June 2006Figure 3: State-dependent coe¢ cients of the optimal policy feedback rule
in the regimes without and with strong ￿nancial frictions, as a function of the
transition probability p from the state without ￿nancial frictions to the state
with strong ￿nancial frictions; assuming a nonzero probability, q = 0:5, of
moving in the opposite direction from the state with strong ￿nancial frictions
to the state without ￿nancial frictions.
27
ECB
Working Paper Series No 639
June 2006Figure 4: Impulse responses to a cost-push shock, allowing for tran-
sitions between the two states without and with strong ￿nancial frictions
(p = q = 0:1), on average over Markov processes (solid line). The case with
zero transition probabilities is shown for comparison, in the state without ￿-
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June 2006Figure 5: Impulse responses to a demand shock, allowing for transi-
tions between the two states without and with strong ￿nancial frictions
(p = q = 0:1), on average over Markov processes (solid line). The case
with zero transition probabilities is shown for comparison, in the state with-
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